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Designing and financing optimal enforcement for small-scale fisheries and dive tourism industries
Poster Title: Designing and financing optimal enforcement for small-scale fisheries and dive tourism industries
Submitted on 22 Jun 2016
Author(s): Gavin McDonald, Tracey Mangin, Lennon R. Thomas, Christopher Costello
Affiliations:  Bren School of Environmental Science & Management, Sustainable Fisheries Group, University of California Santa Barbara, United States
This poster was presented at The 13th International Coral Reef Symposium (ICRS)
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Poster Information
Abstract: Effective enforcement can reduce the impacts of illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing, resulting in numerous economic, ecological, and social benefits. However, resource managers in small-scale fisheries often lack the expertise and financial resources required to design and implement an effective enforcement system. Here, a bio-economic model is developed to investigate optimal levels of fishery enforcement and financing mechanisms available to recover costs of enforcement. The model is parameterized to represent a small-scale Caribbean lobster fishery, and optimal fishery enforcement levels for three different stakeholder archetypes are considered: (1) a fishing industry only; (2) a dive tourism industry only; and (3) fishing and dive tourism industries. For the illustrative small-scale fishery presented, the optimal level of fishery enforcement decreases with increasing levels of biomass, and is higher when a dive tourism industry is present. Results also indicate that costs of fisheries enforcement can be recovered through a suite of financing mechanisms. However, the timescale over which financing becomes sustainable will depend largely on the current status of the fishery resource. This study may serve as a framework that can be used by resource managers to help design and finance economically optimal fisheries enforcement systems.Summary: Highlights:
- A bio-economic model is developed to determine optimal enforcement levels.
- Optimal enforcement levels depend on the stakeholders that use the resource.
- Optimal enforcement levels decrease as the biomass of the target fishery increases.
- Sustainable financing mechanisms for enforcement cost recovery are modeled.
- Enforcement costs can be recovered through sustainable financing mechanisms.
References: 10.1016/j.marpol.2016.02.003Report abuse »
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